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Is a more liberal approach to conservatism needed in forecasting? 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
I discuss evidence that supports several of the principles put forward in the 
paper by Armstrong, Green, and Graefe (AGG), but argue that the packaging of these 
principles as a single “golden rule”’ and the use of the term “conservative” may lead 
to misunderstandings. Additional work should be carried out to investigate the extent 
to which these principles should be applied to probability and interval forecasts. 
Finally, good reasons may support why “rational” forecasters behave in ways that are 
inconsistent with the guidelines AGG provide in their golden-rule checklist. 
 
Keywords: forecasting, conservatism, probability forecasts, prediction 
intervals. 
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1.1 Evidence for the guidelines 
Armstrong, Green, and Graefe (referred to as AGG below) offer much good 
advice and many of the points they make chime with my observations of forecasting 
practices in supply-chain companies.  
     “Claims that things are different now should be met with skeptism” accords 
with the common experience of seeing forecasters summarily dumping their 
computer-based forecasts in favour of unsupported judgment because each new  
month is regarded as a special case. Indeed, the tendency to neglect dull base-rates 
(e.g. statistical forecasts) in favour of more colourful, but less reliable, anecdotal 
information or rumour or sentiment has been reported by psychologists for forty years 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Also, Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) distinguish 
between the “inside view”, where people focus on the specific details  of the situation 
they  are forecasting, and the “outside view” where they downplay these details and 
look at the “class of cases” that are similar to the current case.  The tendency to adopt 
the inside view fosters a perception that the situation that is being forecast is unique 
and that past observations are irrelevant. 
      Similarly, AGG’s advice to “conceal the purpose of the forecast”, where this is 
possible, would prevent forecasts being turned into decisions. As such, the forecast is 
more likely to remain as an honest expectation of what will happen in the future, 
rather than a choice intended to achieve an objective, such as minimizing costs, 
maximizing customer goodwill, or maximising the kudos of a particular section of an 
organization for political reasons (Goodwin, 1998, pp. 95-6). Blurring the distinction 
between forecasts and choice can lead to confusion amongst forecast users and it can 
cause problems when a decision, presented as a forecast, is used in another part of the 
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organization where other objectives apply (Fildes, Goodwin, Lawrence, and 
Nikolopoulos 2009).  
     I have also come across situations in companies where forecasters judgmentally 
select “a particular starting point [in time] for estimating a time-series forecasting 
model …. [allowing them] to make forecasts that support their prior beliefs” (section 
3.1).  In a pharmaceutical company forecasters praised their software because of the 
ease with which they could make these selections. But, conveniently, they referred to 
the resulting forecasts as the “system” forecasts and attributed any errors to the 
deficiencies of the software (Brown, Goodwin, and Fildes, 2011). Forecasting the 
effect of special events independently of the statistical forecasts also makes sense, 
though I have yet to see this idea tested or applied in practice. 
 
2.0 Conservatism and nuanced universality  
This commentary has undergone several revisions as AGG took on board some of the 
earlier points that I made in subsequent revisions of their paper. However, the paper’s 
“headlines” give the impression that the diverse and often complex findings of 
forecasting research can be represented as a [single] “golden rule” with an associated 
simple and potentially misleading label: conservatism.  I would have far fewer 
problems if the authors had referred to what their paper really presents which are 
multiple evidence-based rules applicable to different forecasting contexts. After all, 
who can argue with that, as long as the authors’ interpretation of the evidence is 
accurate? Our raison d’être as forecasting researchers is to seek out evidence to guide 
and improve forecasting practice. A paper that organises and codifies this evidence is 
to be welcomed. 
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     Take the label “conservatism”. The Merrian-Webster dictionary defines this, inter 
alia, as a “dislike of change or new ideas in a particular area”. Dictionary.com defines 
“conservative” as “cautiously moderate or purposefully low”.  My own initial 
impression was that the authors were advocating a universal emphasis on naïve or “no 
change” forecasts. This turns out not to be the case and their recommendations are 
much richer than the term implies. For example, AGG state that: “The no-change 
model is not always conservative. There are many cases where cumulative knowledge 
calls for change” –so why use the term conservative?  It can only distract from, and 
confuse, the paper’s potentially valuable underlying messages.  
     In some cases the rules in the Golden rule checklist would benefit from being more 
nuanced or specific.  For example, 1.1.1 in the checklist states that forecasters should 
“decompose to best use knowledge and information and judgment”.  However, a 
study by MacGregor and Armstrong (1994) reports that multiplicative decomposition 
“improved accuracy only when the situation involved uncertain and extreme 
quantities”. In other situations accuracy was reduced. Similarly, after a review of the 
evidence, Macgregor (2001) suggests that we should “use decomposition when 
uncertainty is high; otherwise use global or holistic estimation”.  To be fair, the 
checklist includes guideline  1.1.2: ”Select evidence-based methods validated for the 
situation”, but this  should surely be an overarching guideline as it interacts with, and can 
therefore invalidate, other guidelines, such as 1.1.1, in particular situations. 
 
3.0 Conservatism and probability forecasts 
     In addition to point forecasts, some measure of uncertainty or risk is often useful. 
The Italian earthquake forecasters, mentioned in the AGG paper, were jailed because 
they did not attach probabilities to their forecasts and simply conveyed the most 
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probable outcome, thereby giving the impression that there was no risk (Mazzotti 
2013). Similarly, the UK Meteorological Office was recently criticised when it 
produced forecasts that “slightly favoured a drier than average” April 2012 (Gray 
2013). It turned out to be the wettest April on record. However, the office had not 
publicised its internal forecast, which allowed for a 10% to 15%   probability that the 
weather would be very wet. Good practice would surely encourage the greater use of 
probability forecasts and prediction intervals, but the paper gives us little guidance 
here and it seems that this is an area that would be worthy of future research.  
     Is being conservative about uncertainty also important?  In studies of how people 
update probability forecasts in the light of new information, conservatism is usually 
considered to be a bad thing (Phillips and Edwards 1966). Here the term is used to 
describe a reluctance to change one’s probability estimates when reliable and highly 
diagnostic information is received –in short a tendency to discount good evidence. 
Bayes theorem provides the normative approach to the updating of probability 
forecasts and the result may be frequent changes of forecasts as each new item of 
information is received.  This normative approach may be consistent with the AGG’s 
notion of conservatism, but once again the term is unhelpful and clearly there is a 
danger of it being used to represent very different forecasting strategies.  
     When it comes to prediction intervals, or forecasts in the form of probability 
distributions, how should the golden rule be applied? Indeed, does it have any direct 
implications, apart from providing guidance on how to estimate the central tendency 
of the associated probability distribution? The usual problem with these types of 
forecasts, irrespective of whether they are produced through statistical methods or 
judgment, is that they have ranges that are too narrow so that they enclose outcomes 
less frequently than they should according to their stated probabilities. Are wider 
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ranges consistent with conservatism? My guess is that they would be even though 
such ranges would acknowledge the possibility of large changes from the current 
situation, and even greater changes than might have been observed in the historical 
data series. The rules which state “specify multiple hypotheses and methods” (1.2.2), “Ask 
judges to write reasons for and against the forecasts”(2.3), “combine independent forecasts 
from judges (2.6)” and  “combine forecasts from diverse evidence-based methods (5)” would 
all  appear to encourage wider ranges.  
 
4.0 Departing from the checklist 
     Finally, the checklist provided is intended to lead to improved forecasts if it is 
adhered to, but decisions regarding forecasting methods usually involve multiple 
objectives. Trade-offs have to be made between the cost of forecast errors, the cost of 
producing forecasts, the time to produce forecasts, and the need to make the forecasts 
credible. Methods like decomposition can be time consuming, employing 
heterogeneous experts can be expensive, and the use of very simple methods may lack 
credibility even if they are generally accurate. On that basis there may be good 
reasons why “rational” forecasters behave in ways that are not consistent with the 
checklist. Often it is reasonable to sacrifice some accuracy in order to achieve other 
objectives such as acceptability.  Imposing penalties on forecasters for non-adherence 
to the list, as suggested, would therefore be inappropriate.  
     Nevertheless, overall the paper is stimulating and it serves a useful purpose by 
challenging many prevailing views. While one may not agree with the basis of all the 
challenges, the debates that they encourage should be to the benefit of forecasting 
research and practice. 
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